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Abstract. Authentication and authorization are an essential part of any
system allowing for information sharing and social interaction. Especially
in such social settings where mobile devices with restricted capabilities
and new possibilities (e.g. screen size, ease of localization) are used, there
is an increasing need for providing privacy-respecting integrity and ac-
cess permission mechanisms by considering trade-offs related to usability
aspects. In this paper we show how the usability of authentication and
authorization related interaction can be enhanced in mobile social set-
tings. This is carried out in our case by using proof-based anonymous
credential systems such as Idemix. The requirements analysis is based on
various case studies in building collaborative systems and oriented to the
needs of the upcoming EU FP7 funded project di.me. We also present
the prototypic implementation and future work directions.
Identity management; idemix; authentication and authorization; security vs.
usability; social interaction
1 Introduction
Due to the rapid evolution of computing systems and sinking costs of connect-
ing them to the Internet, mobile devices are increasingly being used in different
sectors of our leisure and professional life. Recently, Ericsson estimated mobile
subscriptions have hit 5 billion and the Wi-Fi Alliance and Wakefield Research
estimate that only in this year 216 million devices will be sold from which 82
million provide Wi-Fi functionality [1]. Thereby, these devices offer new possi-
bilities of situated interaction and are therefore often also used in social settings.
Such mobility (mostly with continuous connectivity) brings new challenges for
security and privacy in ubiquitous and pervasive computing. However, preserv-
ing the users’ security and privacy in social settings is the most often-cited point
of critique of mobile and ubiquitous computing [2]. Even though anonymization
and data minimization mechanisms (i.e., removing sensitive data like names
or addresses from social network accounts etc.) are provided, the users can be
re-identified across distinct high popular social networks like Facebook, Flickr,
MySpace or Twitter with an error rate of just 12% such as recently shown in [3].
Linkability and the building of user profiles based on social interaction traces
might be the starting point for potential man-in-the-middle attacks.
With respect to the different capabilities and restrictions of modern mobile
devices (e.g. smart-phones and tablet PCs), addressing security and usability
aspects becomes crucial. Experts from various research communities believe that
there are inherent trade-offs between security and usability to be considered
[4][5][6]. Indeed, a good example for trade-offs between security (privacy) and
usability or maybe good design is Apple’s iPhone. Even tough it was less secure
than RIM’s BlackBerry or devices using Microsoft’s Windows Mobile [7] in older
releases, customers were still switching to it and Yahoo announced to focus in
its mobile program on the support of iPhone and abandoned its BlackBerry
smartphone application [8].
In this paper we focus on the usability of authentication and authorization
related interaction and show how both can be enhanced in mobile social settings.
We use thereby a cutting-edge proof-based anonymous credential system called
Idemix. Latter was developed at IBM Research Zurich and meets our needs and
requirements identified in the EU FP7 funded project di.me1. Since di.me is
targeting the involvement from 500 up to 10000 users, possible authentication
and authorization interaction design becomes crucial and affects therefore the
usability of the developed applications. Our prototypic implementation on dif-
ferent Android smart-phones and tablets showed the feasibility of our approach.
We first present related work in Section 2, then we address our problem and
requirements analysis based on case studies and current projects in Section 3.
In section 4 we present our approach as well as implementation details, before
we finish with our conclusion and an outlook about ongoing and future works in
Section 5.
2 Related Work
Social interaction is mostly supported by different categories of collaborative
systems and social software. Such systems have to fulfill multi-user requirements
and are consequently characterized by complex scenarios supporting those re-
quirements in the respective domain.
Often, this complexity is reflected in the user interface (UI) which becomes
crucial for mobile applications deployed on mobile devices with limitations in the
screen space [5][6]. According to Shneiderman et al., ”an extrapolation of current
trends leads to the suggestion that most computer-based tasks will become collab-
orative because just as most work environments have social aspects” [5]. Thus,
software systems and applications supporting social interaction are considered as
1 This work has been funded by the EC(FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement no
257787.
socio-technical systems in the Computer-Supported Cooperative/Collaborative
Work (CSCW) as well as Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) research fields
[9][5]. Mostly, end-users have to balance functionality and their security/privacy
preferences by using several mechanisms built into the system. Authentication
and authorization are the main mechanisms such system has to achieve, ideally
without affecting the usability of the application. Usability related issues are also
discussed in-depth by security and usability researchers in [4] and [10] from both;
theoretical and practical perspectives. Researchers from all cited research fields
generally agree on that security and privacy issues arise due to the way systems
are designed, implemented, and deployed [4][6][5]. Trade-offs between security
and other (non-)functional requirements are well-described in tremendous lot
of classical literature in the corresponding research communities. Nevertheless,
the current state of the art leaves room for considerable improvement how such
systems can support an usable and secure user experience as we show in the
following.
Common practices for authentication are knowledge based authentication
mechanisms (by using a shared secret, e.g. password) or biometric approaches
where unique characteristics of the human body are used to prove a persons’
identity. The widely used password authentication is in general a good approach
under the prerequisite that a secure password is used. In general passwords are
notoriously weak, mostly because of limitations of human information-processing
and/or limited capabilities of the respective mobile device. Even though some
organizations are enforcing different practices (e.g. changing passwords periodi-
cally), applying good practices known from the desktop world remain crucial on
a mobile keyboard and makes the most paranoid security professional rethink
their password strategy [10]. A contribution from the usability field to enhance
authentication is e.g. the usage of graphical password facilities. An example is
the usage of pass-faces for graphical authentication in Android smart-phones to
unlock the main screen. However also those approaches have been proven to be
not secure enough e.g. due to the smudge traces that can emerge on the screen
surface. A recent publication showed that is really easy to guess the right pattern
and break such authentication system [11]. Biometrics also allows for enhancing
authentication but are still ”classified as unreliable because human beings are,
by their very nature, variable”[4][12]. In addition, they are still not popular and
relatively unused today like smart cards and (multifunction) USB tokens. This
is especially true for mobile devices such as smart-phones and tablets.
Related to authorization, most systems need the interaction of the end-users
at least in form of confirmations. The challenges increase if (lay) users are asked
to set access rights for others, delegate rights, or manage their own security and
privacy preferences. In the context of this work, the EU Project PICOS (Pri-
vacy and Identity Management for Community Services) [13] represents a good
and current example. The ”2010 First Community Prototype Lab and Field Test
Report D7.2a” [14] cites that users had problems to use the PICOS privacy
manager on mobile devices (Nokia MusicExpress 5800). Notifications and (auto-
matic) advisory might lead to actions which the user finds intrusive or annoying
in some cases (such as in the well-known case of Windows pop-ups or MSWord’s
paper-clip). Especially in collaborative applications as socio-technical systems,
this will affect the psychological acceptance of the application which leads to
not using security and privacy mechanisms. This mostly results in expensive
change requirements affecting the technical realization of mobile applications
[4][15]. Indeed, people involvement varies and the usage can range from occa-
sional to frequent according to a given setting and circumstances. The same
socio-technical system can lead to different evaluation results in different social
environments [9].
For both; authentication and authorization, cryptography is an established
used mechanism for increasing confidentiality and integrity of exchanged data.
However, a total security or privacy provision is an illusion [2] because current
approaches are not able to avoid at least threats and attacks e.g. emerging from
loosing devices or based on physical access to them [10]. Approaches mostly only
focus on hindering such attacks or making them difficult. Security and usability
research for developing usable (psychologically acceptable) security mechanisms
is a young research field which depends on the context in which those mechanisms
have to be used [4]. Because of this and many facts cited above, we argue that
security and privacy design by considering usability is specific to the project
context and we thus analyze authentication and authorization requirements in
this paper based on concrete di.me requirements by considering lessons learned
from previous projects and good practices cited in standard literature.
3 Requirement Analysis
3.1 Requirements based on previous experiences with collaborative
platforms
In this sub-section, we introduce the CURE (Collaborative Universal Remote
Education) platform as a basis for a part of our requirements analysis on dealing
with authentication and authorization in social (collaborative) settings. CURE
supports self-organized learning and a wide range of learning scenarios (i.e. col-
laborative exercises, tutor-guided groups with collaborative exercises, virtual
seminars, virtual labs, collaborative exam preparation) at the German Distance
Learning University [16]. CURE is used now in different fields and hence covering
CSCW, and not only CSCL, scenarios. Since fall 2004, CURE is an integral part
of the virtual learning space of the FernUniversa¨t in Hagen, is available under an
open source license, and has currently more than 2500 registered users. During
this long time period the CURE designers received valuable user feedback also
concerning privacy, awareness, and usability concerns and shared these with us.
Choosing the CURE platform is due to different reasons meeting our ar-
gumentation in this paper: (1) CURE can be seen as a representative general-
purpose collaborative system and its conceptual design is common to a wide
range of existing collaboration platforms and systems (provides Wiki, forums,
uploads, mail and chat etc.), and (2) the improvement needs in CURE we were
informed about from our partners over many years of usage have a valid charac-
ter for many systems supporting social interaction. CURE uses a room metaphor
to model shared workspaces for groups. A virtual key metaphor is used to de-
termine access rights and possible interactions in rooms. Users who have keys
to a given room can form groups in that room in order to cooperate and work
with each other. The structuring of collaborative environments is carried out by
connecting individual rooms. The virtual keys of a user determine their possible
interactions in a given room. Users with sufficient rights, such as for creating ad-
jacent rooms or passing on virtual keys, can adapt the collaborative environment
according to their needs. So, end-users are able to manage and control access
rights to their rooms, and can flexibly organize their work themselves. Dynamic
groups can be formed without privileged users. End-users (instructors, tutors,
students etc.) are able to form groups (1) by key assignment, (2) by invitation,
(3) with free enrollment, and (4) enrollment confirmed by the members of the
respective groups [17].
Some of the detected privacy issues were solved in the work described in [18]
(related to real-identity issues in CURE). In the context of this paper, however,
some of the open issues are still existing and are closely related with authenti-
cation and authorization. For instance, even though a workflow for easing key
creation and configuration (i.e. time validity) as well as key assignment is pro-
vided; there are still a lot of possible enhancements from which we enumerate a
few in the following:
1. E-learing platforms (e.g. CURE, BSCW or Moodle etc.) mostly represent
a real-identity collaboration system and users have to use their real names
(instructors) or their university pseudonyms (based on students Ids) in order
to access the materials.
2. Creation, configuration, and assignment of access rights remains difficult for
lay users even though online help and documentation is available. If a user
asks other users for rights in their rooms (confirmed enrollment), the lat-
ter has to check asked rights and agree. Experiences show that this task
generates many situations that affect security, privacy, and trust in such
environments. For example, (1) requests are hasty agreed without checking
their rights, (2) agreed by reducing their rights (by disappointing the re-
questing user), or (3) delayed in order to check them properly (by blocking
the cooperation). People are task-oriented and might be disturbed with such
requests also in the case of group building by invitation or key assignment[4].
3.2 Requirements based on di.me scenarios
di.me aims at providing a user-ware tool integrating all personal data in a per-
sonal sphere by a single, user-controlled point of access. This tool will run on
the user’s (mobile) devices, and rely on scaleable peer-to-peer (P2P) communi-
cation in order to avoid external storage of personal data as far as possible and
to enhance data portability. External services (e.g. web-communities, enterprise
systems) will be integrated via gateways. Communication to individuals and ser-
vices will make use of digital faces (representing partial identities), i.e. user data
selected for a particular purpose and context. A work package related to our
work has to provide an open trust, privacy, and security infrastructure which
enables the end-users to securely use their personal data. For this, di.me targets
to leverage and elaborate concepts such as digital faces as well as anonymity
at the application level (anonymous user-controlled identity management; IdM)
and supporting secure mechanisms at the network level, too (e.g. by supporting
TOR anonymity).
In summary, the first analysis of selected di.me scenarios identified the need
for usability enhancements which are very similar to identified needs for CURE
in the previous sub-section related to authentication and authorization. In our
case, Idemix represents the best possibility to fulfill di.me’s requirements without
additional development costs. Idemix is licensed for non commercial usage in EU
projects since it was and is still being developed and used in projects funded by
the EU (Prime and PrimeLife). Such proceeding of using results from previous
EU funded projects is also strategically preferred by the EU. However, Idemix
represents a cutting-edge framework in comparison to other solutions like U-
Prove [19].
First usage of Idemix on mobile smartphones showed the need for perfor-
mance enhancements. The evaluation results showed that requests could reach
20 seconds according to the proofs complexity in combination with enabling
TOR-Anonymity [20]. This could negatively affect the intended user trials since
di.me targets the involvement of a very large testers community (from 500 up
to 10000 as mentioned before). Since performance is seen as a quality of ser-
vice requirement from the usability perspective and an availability requirement
from the security point of view2, we performed a deep performance evaluation
of Idemix usage in those scenarios. For accuracy, ”Developing a prototype ref-
erence implementation of an IdM system for mobile end-user devices is one of
the high-level requirements of di.me” which implicates the following concrete
requirements:
1. the IdM to be developed or integrated by using Idemix has to be deployable
on mobile platforms without affecting usability acceptance for instance in
terms of interaction design or performance (response times) by enhancing
selected authentication and authorization if possible in order to not delay or
block social interaction (R1),
2. and thereby with considering the end-users’ security and privacy needs e.g.
for anonymity, un-linkability and so on (R2).
3. Because di.me wants to leverage P2P possibilities, a realistic mobile collab-
orative scenario implementation has to be provided and evaluated on the
target mobile platform for R1 and R2 (R3).
2 The reader may remember the security triangle: confidentiality, integrity, and avail-
ability.
4 Our Approach
To fulfill the requirements R1-R3 we identified in Section 3, we analyzed selected
di.me scenarios and use cases with respect to security, privacy, and trust. In the
following, we first provide background information to Idemix, then we show how
Idemix can be used for fulfilling R1-R3 in di.me scenarios, and we finally describe
our implementation.
4.1 Idemix background information
Idemix is an anonymous credential system, developed by the research group led
by Jan Camenisch at IBM Research Zurich [21]. It enables to perform anony-
mous authentication between users and/or service providers and as well supports
accountability of transactions [22]. An Idemix credential is obtained from an is-
suing authority, attesting to the users attributes such as birth date or access
rights and allows for various protocols and mechanisms cited in standard litera-
ture (i.e. property proofs, usage limitation, revocation of credentials, revocation
of anonymity, verifiable encryption). The main protocols performed, are the cre-
dential issuance and the show proof protocol which are using the Camenisch-
Lysyanskaya signature scheme [23],[24]. With Idemix, one could prove to Ama-
zon being over 18 when buying games having such restriction without disclosing
the accurate birthday (only in theory, because Amazon does not yet support
idemix). Furthermore, one can pay and receive the respective game and only
the delivery service (e.g. DHL or UPS) will be able to see his/her address etc.
The following Figure 1 illustrates the Idemix collaboration in a CURE-based
scenario. Alice and Bob are each interactively creating a credential with the
certificate authority (CA). The issuing CA signs this credential with its private
key, so it can easily be verified using the issueraˆs public key. It also contains
a pseudonym, that was generated from the users master key, to bind the users
identity to the credential [25]. As shown in Figure 1, Alice and Bob are com-
municating with each other directly, over the XMPP server (eJabberd), or they
can collaborate with other users using a common server (here CURE). In both
cases, the communication is performed completely anonymously. They are also
completely free to decide if they only want to use one of both mechanisms. To
authenticate and authorize them for certain actions, users can create customized,
context dependent aˆproofsaˆ (which are verifiable statements about attributes)
with their credentials. In contrast to privacy enhancing technologies sending
pseudonym certificates to a given verifier, the credential itself is never revealed.
This makes profile building based on attribute inferring tedious. The computed
proof (such as ”I am older than 18” or ”working in the automotive industry”)
has the characteristic to be zero-knowledge, and thereby allows un-linkable, se-
lective disclosure of such attested credential attributes while not revealing others
(realizing so different di.me’s digital faces). In our context, users can use such a
proof to authenticate themselves to each other or to gain authorized access to
the CURE server.
Fig. 1. Idemix CURE-based collaboration scenario
4.2 Our approach and its usage for implementation the di.me
Conference Scenario
From the previous explanations, Idemix represents a perfect starting point for
automating privacy-enhancing authentication and authorization in the back-
ground meeting so R1 and R2. By allowing for background authentication and
authorization, a good performance could be reached since designing interaction
not expecting user intervention becomes possible. Indeed, the CA could provide
needed acknowledgements for access permission enforcement without waiting on
user interaction in the UI. However, this needs a pre-defined set of attributes
which are allowed to be included into automatic generated proofs. For this we
provide a separate UI allowing for combining attributes and bundling them to a
single proof, that have to be shown in order to obtain a permission. For meeting
R3, we implemented the so-called Conference Scenario in which the attendees
have the option to publish some selected personal contact information on a con-
ference shared space (CURE website in our prototypic implementation). The
other attendees can browse the information and could e.g send contact requests
(i.e. requesting further materials such as slides or further contact data). When
publishing such information, it is possible to conceal some information and make
them only available for people in possession of a particular attribute (e.g. the
email address is only visible to people working in the automotive industry). The
access to the materials is automatically performed in the background without
explicit users intervention in UIs because Idemix allows for this. Since all atten-
Alice Bob
broadcast 
digital face
send:
 required:[job == automotive engineer] 
send:
proof [job == automotive engineer] 
compute proof 
request further Information
verify proof
grant access
Fig. 2. Sequence diagram of the broadcasting process
dees receive a special credential proving they are registered participants of the
conference, authentication is also carried out in the same way, namely, transpar-
ently in the background without any end-user intervention. Besides the public
section of the website, where everybody can publish contact information, there
are several virtual conference rooms and discussion forums. Attendees can e.g.
create their own private chat rooms. If another attendee likes to join this chat
room, he/she has to prove that e.g. his job is ”automotive engineer”. Since EU
mobile network providers do not allow clients to use different dynamic IPs such
as in Australia, becoming a P2P server and client at the same time has to be
modeled otherwise in our case. For simulating P2P social settings we used an
eJabberd XMPP Server [26]. It was set up in our lab tests in an ad-hoc manner
(by directly setting its WiFi IP via an UI provided at the level of the mobile
client application). A global conference room was used to broadcast general in-
formation to the conference and all clients were signed-in through the duration
of the conference. Separate conference rooms for each session, track or interest
group can also be set up in ad-hoc manner by the end-users. Since all clients
connected to a conference room (global or concern-related) receive the XMPP
messages going to this room, end-users are able to react on information they
are interested in (represented in a messages ListView in the client UI such as
”Further contact data available for engineers”). If an interested attender clicks
on a given message, a request is sent to the broadcaster. Thereby Idemix is act-
ing in the background for authentication as well as for authorization. Figure 2
shows such interaction in form of a sequence diagram for a potential interaction
between Bob and Alice. As depicted in the sequence diagram the following steps
are carried out:
Broadcasting personal information To publish personal information all
clients are joining a hidden conference room (group chat). In this channel users
can broadcast messages, and as well browse the messages of the other users. The
client application parses and formats the messages in the group chat in order to
make it more comfortable for the user to browse them on the mobile device.
Automated proofs If the client tries to access a document that is restricted
to users with a certain attribute, a challenge is send to the client, asking it to
proof a certain value of an attribute (e.g. attribute JOB == ”engineer”). If the
necessary credential exists, the client now automatically creates a fitting proof
statement and sends it to the requester. The latter now verifies that proof and
grants access.
4.3 Implementing details
To verify the feasibility of our approach for our scenario we implemented an
Android-based prototype as well as a server-side supporting CURE or eJabberd
servers. The client mobile application is able to perform the two main protocols of
Idemix (”Get Credential” and ”Show Proof”) either via XMPP or via XML-RPC
requests. This section should give a short overview about the implementation
details of our concrete requirements.
Client/server architecture In our approach we are using two different servers;
the credential issuance server, where users obtain their conference credential as
well as a collaboration server. The Certificate Authority (CA) is written in Java
and implementing an XML-RPC servlet, so we can send XML-RPC requests
to perform the credential issuance protocol. The server supports full Idemix
capabilities, so it is also possible to show proofs to the server. This can be
used, for example if an additional authentication is needed in order so sign a
new credential. The collaboration can be in our case a CURE server or any
eJabberd server which can be accessed via WiFi. It also allows us to easily fulfill
requirements (we are not focusing on in this paper) like group awareness and
real time communication. As mentioned before, users can create their own chat
rooms and can define certain restrictions other users have to fulfill in order to
join. At the moment there is just password protection, but in order to obtain
the password, users can send an Idemix proof to the owner.
Client-to-client communication In order to be able to show proofs to other
users, the clients are connected to an XMPP server. Therefore we implement a
Fig. 3. Client class diagram of the Android-based prototype
custom XMPP extension, allowing us to send customized ,”Idemix messages”
(as we described above for ”Further data is available” or similar messages) to
be able to perform the Idemix protocols. In our current prototype the XMPP
server is installed on a secure machine, maintained by the conference organizer.
Additionally the transmitted traffic is TLS encrypted to ensure confidentiality
of communications. The client class diagram allowing for XMPP and also XML-
RPC functionality is shown in Figure 3.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we showed how authentication and authorization can be enhanced
by using the Idemix system. Since Idemix is a proof-based identity mixer, it
allows for automating some scenarios by providing un-linkable anonymity. The
feasibility of our approach was demonstrated by implementing the di.me Con-
ference Scenario which enables participants to transparently exchange data in
the background without the need for explicit interaction (e.g. in UIs). This is
possible since Idemix assesses that the attendees fulfill some attributes in the
background (i.e. required affiliation) and provide access without disturbing the
information provider. The same is carried out for transparent authentication in
the background. Furthermore, our Android-based client implementation lever-
ages P2P capabilities to enhance the security and privacy explicitly required in
various di.me scenarios. With this, our approach presents a new solution which
is to our best knowledge not addressed in related work. Future directions intend
enhancing the P2P capabilities by integrating the P2P server on the same client.
So, there will be no need for providing ad-hoc trustable P2P servers in order to
support our scenarios such as described in the Conference Scenario. Wi-Fi Di-
rect in combination with server-less XMPP (see also [27]) might help to perform
flexible, secure near range exchange of data. Other efforts are also followed by
our usability experts to provide a usable interface for defining attribute-based
proofs (for lay users without Idemix background, too). However, Idemix does
not allow for building contradictory attribute combinations, so that testers were
able in our lab tests to create proofs without big cognitive load.
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